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How to provide restitution to victims of child pornography crimes has 
recently proven to be a challenge for courts across the country.  The difficulty 
stems from the fact that child pornography is often widely disseminated to 
countless thousands of criminals who have a prurient interest in such materials.  
While the victims of child pornography crimes often have significant financial 
losses from the crimes (such as the need for long term psychological counseling), it 
is very difficult to assign a particular fraction of a victim’s losses to any particular 
criminal defendant. 
Last spring, the United States Supreme Court gave its answer to how to 
resolve this issue with its ruling in Paroline v. United States.1  Interpreting a 
restitution statute enacted by Congress, the Court concluded that in a child 
pornography prosecution, a restitution award from a particular defendant is only 
appropriate to the extent that it reflects “the defendant’s relative role in the causal 
process that underlies the victim’s general losses.”2  Exactly what this holding 
means is not immediately clear, and lower courts are currently struggling to 
interpret it. 
This article questions the Court’s Paroline holding, particularly its failure to 
offer any real guidance on exactly what amount of restitution district court judges 
should award in child pornography cases.  Members of Congress, too, have 
doubted the wisdom of the decision, introducing a bill (the Amy and Vicky Act) 
with strong bi-partisan sponsorship that would essentially overrule Paroline.3  
Congress has proposed certain set amounts of restitution for particular child 
pornography crimes.  This approach seems like a good one for providing clarity to 
district court judges as well as assuring full restitution for child pornography 
victims.  And, as of the drafting of this article, Congress seems likely to adopt this 
approach, as the Amy and Vicky Act passed the Senate by a resounding 98-0 vote.4   
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1   Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014). 
2   Id. at 1727. 
3   Amy and Vicky Child Pornography Victim Restitution Improvement Act of 2015, S. 295, 
114th Cong. (2015). 
4   Id. 
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Part I of this article discusses the need of child pornography victims for 
restitution, using the story of one woman (“Amy”) as an illustration.   
Part II then turns to the legal regime surrounding restitution for such victims, 
explaining why the current child pornography restitution statute—properly 
understood—requires that each defendant pay full restitution.   
Part III then examines the Supreme Court’s Paroline decision rejecting full 
restitution.  Contrary to the views of the Court’s majority, the statute is not best 
interpreted as limiting a defendant’s responsibility for restitution to his “relative 
role in the causal process” of contributing to a victim’s losses.  To the contrary, 
this interpretation thwarts Congress’ clear aim of providing generous restitution to 
child pornography victims.   
Finally, Part IV discusses the Amy and Vicky Act, which will simplify the 
restitution process.  By establishing set amounts of restitution that must be 
awarded in child pornography cases, the legislation will return rationality to the 
restitution system, reduce the burden on trial courts, and (most importantly) assure 
victims of child pornography crimes that they will receive the full restitution that 
they desperately need.  Congress should enact, and the President should sign, such 
legislation rapidly. 
 
I. AMY’S VICTIMIZATION 
 
The Supreme Court’s recent Paroline decision involved not only the named 
defendant—Randall Doyle Paroline—but also a victim, a young woman who we 
will refer to pseudonymously as “Amy.”5  When she was eight and nine years old, 
Amy was repeatedly raped by her uncle in order to produce child pornography.6  
The images of her abuse depict Amy being forced to endure vaginal and anal rape, 
cunnilingus, fellatio, and digital penetration.  Amy was sexually abused 
specifically for the purpose of producing child sex abuse images; her uncle 
required her “to perform sex acts” requested by others who wanted her images for 
their own sexual gratification.  Amy’s abuser pleaded guilty to production of child 
                                                                                                                                          
5   The authors are privileged to have represented Amy throughout the federal court system in 
her effort to obtain restitution, including before the Supreme Court.  Unless otherwise attributed, the 
facts in this Part are taken from Amy’s brief in Paroline to the Supreme Court.  See Respondent 
Amy’s Brief on the Merits, Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014) (No. 12-8561) 
[hereinafter Amy’s Merits Br.].   
6   While the legal term “child pornography” is used throughout this article, that term 
“contributes to a fundamental misunderstanding of the crime—one that . . . leaves the impression that 
what is depicted in the[se] photograph[s] is [adult] ‘pornography’ rather than images memorializing 
the sexual assault of children.”  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CHILD 
EXPLOITATION PREVENTION AND INTERDICTION: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 8 (2010) [hereinafter DOJ 
REPORT TO CONGRESS].  See generally PAUL G. CASSELL, JAMES MARSH & JEREMY CHRISTIANSEN, 
Not Just “Kiddie Porn”: The Real Harms from Possession of Child Pornography, in REFINING CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY LAW: CRIME, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCE (forthcoming 2014); PHILIP 
JENKINS, BEYOND TOLERANCE: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET (2001). 
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pornography7 and in 1999 was sentenced to 121 months in prison.  He was also 
ordered to pay the psychological counseling costs Amy had incurred up to that 
time, a total of $6,325. 
By the end of her treatment in 1999, Amy was—as reflected in her therapist’s 
notes—“back to normal” and engaged in age-appropriate activities such as dance 
lessons.  Sadly, eight years later, Amy’s condition drastically deteriorated when 
she discovered that her child sex abuse images are widely traded on the Internet.  
The “Misty” series depicting Amy is one of the most widely-circulated sets of 
child sex abuse images in the world.  According to her psychologist, the global 
trafficking of Amy’s child sex abuse images has caused “long lasting and life 
changing impact[s] on her.”8 “Amy’s awareness of these pictures [and] knowledge 
of new defendants being arrested become ongoing triggers to her.”9 As Amy 
explained in her own personal victim impact statement, “[e]very day of my life I 
live in constant fear that someone will see my pictures and recognize me and that I 
will be humiliated all over again.”10  
The ongoing victimization Amy suffers from the continued distribution and 
collection of her images will last throughout her entire life.  She could not 
complete college and finds it difficult to engage in full-time employment because 
she fears encountering individuals who may have seen her being raped as a child.  
She will also require weekly psychological therapy and occasionally more 
intensive in-patient treatment throughout her life.  
One of the criminals who joined in the collective exploitation of Amy is 
Doyle Randall Paroline.  In 2008, law enforcement agents discovered that he had 
downloaded several hundred images of young children (including toddlers) 
engaging in sexual acts with adults and animals.  When the agents questioned him 
about the images, he admitted he had been downloading child pornography for two 
years.  On January 9, 2009, Paroline pleaded guilty to one count of possession of 
material involving the sexual exploitation of children.11 
The FBI then sent the images it discovered on Paroline’s computers to the 
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC).  Its analysis 
revealed that Amy was one of the children victimized in those images.  Based on 
that information, the United States Attorney’s Office notified Amy’s trial counsel 
that Amy was an identified victim in Paroline’s criminal case.  Amy’s counsel then 
submitted a detailed restitution request on Amy’s behalf, describing the harm she 
endures from knowing that she is powerless to stop the Internet trading of her child 
                                                                                                                                          
7   See 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (2008). 
8   Joint Appendix vol. I at 81, Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014) (No. 12–
8561). 
9   Id. at 84.   
10  Id. at 60.  
11  See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2012) (made a ten-year felony by 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2) 
(2012)). 
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sex abuse images.  In her restitution request, Amy sought full restitution of 
$3,367,854 from Paroline for lost wages and psychological counseling costs.  
On June 10, 2009, the district court sentenced Paroline to twenty-four months 
in prison.  During a later adversarial restitution hearing, Amy’s counsel and the 
Government defended her full restitution request against Paroline’s attacks. 
On December 7, 2009, the district court issued an opinion declining to award 
Amy any restitution even though restitution for the “full amount” of a victim’s 
losses is “mandatory” under the child pornography restitution statute, 18 U.S.C. § 
2259.12  The court began by making a factual finding that Amy was a “victim” of 
Paroline’s crime because of his gross invasion of her privacy.13  Although the 
district court recognized that a “significant” part of Amy’s losses is “attribut[able] 
to the widespread dissemination and availability of her images and the possession 
of those images by many individuals such as Paroline,”14 it nonetheless refused to 
award her any restitution because she could not prove exactly what losses 
proximately resulted from Paroline’s crime.15  The district court acknowledged that 
its interpretation of the child pornography restitution statute rendered it “largely 
unworkable.”16  
Amy promptly sought review of the district court’s denial of her restitution 
request, employing the appellate review provision found in the Crime Victims’ 
Rights Act (CVRA).17 Acting quickly, a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit declined 
to grant any relief, with Judge Dennis dissenting.18  
Amy then petitioned for rehearing.  On March 22, 2011, the Fifth Circuit 
unanimously granted Amy’s petition and concluded that the district court had 
“clearly and indisputably erred” in grafting a proximate result requirement onto the 
restitution statute.19  Paroline successfully sought rehearing en banc. 
On November 19, 2012, the Fifth Circuit en banc held 10-5 that 18 U.S.C. § 
2259 does not require a child pornography victim to establish that her losses were 
the proximate result of an individual defendant’s crime in order to secure 
restitution.20  The Fifth Circuit concluded that § 2259 creates a system of joint and 
several liability, which “applies well in these circumstances, where victims like 
Amy are harmed by defendants acting separately who have caused her a single 
harm.”21  After resolving the statutory construction issue in Amy’s favor, the Fifth 
                                                                                                                                          
12  See United States v. Paroline, 672 F.Supp. 2d 781, 784–85 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (discussing 18 
U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1), (b)(4)).  
13  Id at 785. 
14  Id. at 792. 
15  Id. at 790. 
16  Id. at 793 n.12. 
17  18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (2009). 
18  In re Amy, 591 F.3d 792, 795 (5th Cir. 2009). 
19  In re Amy Unknown, 636 F.3d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 2011).   
20  In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749, 750, 752 (5th Cir. 2012). 
21  Id. at 769. 
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Circuit remanded, directing that “the district court must enter a restitution order 
reflecting the ‘full amount of [Amy’s] losses’ . . ..”22  
Paroline sought review in the Supreme Court.  Amy agreed that review was 
appropriate and the Court granted certiorari.  
 
II. AMY’S ARGUMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT  
 
In her briefing to the Supreme Court,23 Amy asked for enforcement of a 
“mandatory” restitution statute—18 U.S.C. § 2259—promising her that she would 
receive restitution for the “full amount” of her losses.24  Amy urged the Court to 
read § 2259 to achieve Congress’ explicit compensatory aims, not to thwart them.25  
As the Fifth Circuit en banc interpreted the statute, it did not require a child 
pornography victim to establish precisely what fraction of, for example, her 
psychological counseling costs are the proximate result of an individual 
defendant’s crime.26  Instead, victims like Amy must first establish that they 
suffered “harm” from a defendant’s child pornography crime.27  This cause-in-fact 
link or nexus between an individual’s harm and a defendant’s crime establishes a 
statutorily-recognized “victim” entitled to restitution for the “full amount” of her 
losses.28  Amy pointed out that the district court had made a factual finding that 
Paroline’s possession of her images harmed Amy.29  
Amy explained that under the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, a victim can 
easily establish the “full amount” of her losses from child pornography.30  In the 
district court, Amy provided detailed expert evidence of, for example, the 
projected costs for psychological counseling she requires due to being a victim of 
child pornography.31 Amy argued that these costs are the losses Congress 
commanded must be awarded as restitution.32  Amy accordingly urged the Court to 
affirm the Fifth Circuit’s decision, thereby making Paroline jointly and severally 
liable for her full losses, along with other defendants convicted in other cases.33  
Amy further argued that:  
 
                                                                                                                                          
22  Id. at 774. 
23  See Amy’s Merits Br., supra note 5. 
24  18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1) (1996). 
25  Amy’s Merits Br., supra note 5, at 7. 
26  In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749, 762 (5th Cir. 2012). 
27  See 18 U.S.C. § 2259(c) (1996). 
28  18 U.S.C. § 2259(c), (b)(1) (1996). 
29  Amy’s Merits Br., supra note 5, at 15. 
30  Id. at 17. 
31  Id. at 8. 
32  Id. 
33  Id. at 38–51. 
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the Fifth Circuit’s “practical interpretation” of § 2259 follows applicable 
tort law principles—i.e., the principles providing ample compensation to 
victims of intentional torts.  Section 2259 applies to serious felonies with 
stringent mens rea requirements.  For such intentional torts committed 
against vulnerable victims, the common law was never concerned about 
strict “proximate cause” limitations, but instead imposed broad joint and 
several liability.  When choosing between equalizing the liability of 
intentional wrongdoers and fully compensating those harmed by 
wrongdoers, the common law has always sided with victims.  Congress 
wisely did the same thing in enacting § 2259.34 
 
Amy also pointed to an important background principle that, in her view, 
should be in play when interpreting § 2259.  Amy emphasized that child 
pornography possession is not a “victimless” crime, emphasizing that Congress 
specifically found that “[e]very instance of viewing images of child pornography 
represents a renewed violation of the privacy of the victims and repetition of their 
abuse.”35  Amy quoted from an earlier Supreme Court decision that “[a] child who 
has posed for a camera must go through life knowing that the recording is 
circulating within the mass distribution system for child pornography . . ..  [I]t is 
the fear of exposure and the tension of keeping the act secret that seem to have the 
most profound emotional repercussions.”36  
Amy also noted “the vast machinery” that generates child pornography 
harms.37 In enacting laws criminalizing all aspects of child pornography, Congress 
realized that it had to address every stage of this destructive joint enterprise—
countless criminals who together create, distribute, and possess child pornography.  
The Supreme Court had previously held that “it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
halt” the sexual exploitation and abuse of children by pursuing only child 
pornography producers.38 It was therefore reasonable for Congress to conclude that 
“the production of child pornography [will decrease] if it penalizes those who 
possess and view the product, thereby decreasing demand.”39 Indeed, “[t]he most 
expeditious if not the only practical method of law enforcement may be to dry up 
                                                                                                                                          
34  Id. at 8. 
35  Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 501(2)(D), 
120 Stat. 587, 623–24. 
36  New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 n.10 (1982). (quoting D.P. Shouvlin, Preventing 
the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 535, 545 (1981) and 
Ulrich C. Schoettle, Child Exploitation: A Study of Child Pornography, 19 J.AM. ACAD. CHILD 
PSYCHIATRY 289, 292 (1980)). 
37  Amy’s Merits Br., supra note 5, at 12. 
38  Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759–60. 
39  Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1990). 
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the market for this material by imposing severe criminal penalties” on all persons 
in the distribution chain.40 
Amy also explained that Congress had previously recognized that those who 
possess child pornography are inextricably linked to its producers.  Congressional 
findings concerning Chapter 110 declare that “prohibiting the possession and 
viewing of child pornography will . . . [help] to eliminate the market for the sexual 
exploitative use of children . . ..”41 Amy cited a recent Justice Department analysis, 
which reported that “the growing and thriving market for child pornographic 
images is responsible for fresh child sexual abuse—because the high demand for 
child pornography drives some individuals to sexually abuse children and some to 
‘commission’ the abuse for profit or status.”42  
Amy also described the mechanisms by which child pornography is so widely 
distributed.  Once a child such as Amy is sexually abused to produce digitized 
child pornography, the images can be disseminated exponentially worldwide.  
Peer-to-peer file sharing (commonly called “P2P”) is “widely used to download 
child pornography.”43 Two recent law enforcement initiatives “identified over 20 
million unique IP [Internet Protocol] addresses offering child pornography over 
P2P networks from 2006 to August 2010.”44  The ease with which child 
pornography can now be downloaded creates “an expanding market for child 
pornography [that] fuels greater demand for perverse sexual depictions of children, 
making it more difficult for authorities to prevent their sexual exploitation and 
abuse.”45 
In the case before the Supreme Court, Paroline downloaded several hundred 
images of toddlers and other children being sexually abused—including two 
depicting Amy.46  Paroline was not the only one to do so.  The National Center for 
Missing and Exploited Children had previously identified “at least 35,000 images 
of Amy’s abuse among the evidence in over 3,200 child pornography cases since 
                                                                                                                                          
40  Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760.  Congress did just that by criminalizing child pornography 
possession.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4) (2012). 
41  Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, § 121(12), 110 Stat. 
3009–26, 3009–27; see also 132 CONG. REC. 33,781 (1986) (statement of Sen. Roth) (“[M]y 
subcommittee’s investigation disclosed the existence of a seamy underground network of child 
molesters . . . and it showed that the very lifeblood of this loosely organized underground society is 
child pornography.”). 
42  Amy’s Merits Br., supra note 5, at 11 (citing DOJ REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 6, at 
17). 
43  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: FEDERAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
OFFENSES 51 (2012), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/ congressional-testimony-and-
reports/sex-offense-topics/201212-federal-child-pornography-offenses/Full_Report_to_Congress.pdf 
[hereinafter SENTENCING COMM’N REPORT TO CONGRESS]. 
44  Id. at 51–52. 
45  United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204, 217 (2d Cir. 2013). 
46  Joint Appendix vol. I at 146, Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014) (No. 12–
8561). 
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1998 and described the content of these images as ʻextremely graphic.’”47  Amy 
asked the Court to decide her case against “the sobering reality that Congress 
needed to respond to a vast, de facto joint criminal enterprise of child pornography 
producers, distributors, and possessors.”48  
 
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION 
 
On April 23, 2014, the Court announced its decision in Paroline.49   Justice 
Kennedy wrote the majority opinion for five members of the Court, rejecting 
Amy’s arguments.  Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, 
dissented, as did Justice Sotomayor. 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion first held that § 2259 imposes a proximate 
cause requirement on victims attempting to recover restitution for their losses.  
Justice Kennedy began by examining the text of the statute, which provides that 
child pornography victims receive restitution for the “full amount” of their losses 
and then defines the full amount as including: 
 
[A]ny costs incurred by the victim for—  
(A) medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological 
care;  
(B) physical and occupational therapy or rehabilitation;  
(C) necessary transportation, temporary housing, and child care 
expenses;  
(D) lost income;  
(E) attorneys’ fees, as well as other costs incurred; and  
(F) any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the 
offense.50  
 
The majority noted that the “proximate cause” language in the statute made 
“the interpretive task … easier” because that language could be read as applying 
not just in subsection (F) where the language appears, but elsewhere as well.51  
Subsection (F), Justice Kennedy concluded “is most naturally understood as a 
summary of the type of losses covered—i.e., losses suffered as a proximate result 
of the offense.”52  “Restitution is therefore proper under § 2259 only to the extent 
the defendant's offense proximately caused a victim's losses,” Justice Kennedy 
reasoned.53   
                                                                                                                                          
47  Id. vol. II at 352. 
48  Amy’s Merits Br., supra note 5, at 12–13. 
49  Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (2014). 
50  Id. at 1720 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3) (2012)). 
51  Id. 
52  Id. at 1721. 
53  Id. at 1722. 
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The majority next turned to the question of how to apply the statute’s 
causation requirements.  Justice Kennedy thought that it was “simple enough for 
the victim to prove the aggregate losses, including the costs of psychiatric 
treatment and lost income, that stem from the ongoing traffic in her images as a 
whole.”54  Justice Kennedy called these losses “general losses” and explained that 
the challenge is determining what part “of those general losses, if any, that are the 
proximate result of the offense conduct of a particular defendant who is one of 
thousands who have possessed and will in the future possess the victim's images 
but who has no other connection to the victim.”55  
Justice Kennedy then examined whether a “but for” test could be used to 
identify the losses suffered by a victim as the result of a particular defendant’s 
crime.  The difficulty with this approach, however, is that a showing of but for 
causation cannot be made since “it is not possible to prove that her losses would be 
less (and by how much) but for one possessor's individual role in the large, loosely 
connected network through which her images circulate.”56   
Justice Kennedy next turned to the causation test identified in the Restatement 
of Torts for “[m]ultiple sufficient causal sets” causing an injury—such as when 
three persons lean on a car and the weight of all three is necessary to propel the car 
off of a cliff.57  The Justice explained that such tests “though salutary when applied 
in a judicious manner, also can be taken too far.”58  He concluded that applying the 
test here would be taking things “too far,” because “[it] would make an individual 
possessor liable for the combined consequences of the acts of not just 2, 5, or even 
100 independently acting offenders; but instead, a number that may reach into the 
tens of thousands.”59  
For all these reasons, the majority rejected Amy’s argument that an individual 
possessor should be held responsible for all of a victim’s losses.60  But Justice 
Kennedy also rejected the “anomalous” position that each defendant would be 
responsible for no restitution at all.61  Instead, he held that each defendant should 
pay some amount of restitution:  
 
In this special context, where it can be shown both that a defendant 
possessed a victim's images and that a victim has outstanding losses 
caused by the continuing traffic in those images but where it is 
impossible to trace a particular amount of those losses to the individual 
                                                                                                                                          
54  Id. 
55  Id. 
56  Id. at 1723. 
57  Id. (citing RESTATEMENT § 27 cmt. f, at 380-81).  
58  Id. 
59  Id. at 1725. 
60  Id. at 1724. 
61  Id. 
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defendant by recourse to a more traditional causal inquiry, a court 
applying § 2259 should order restitution in an amount that comports with 
the defendant's relative role in the causal process that underlies the 
victim's general losses.62   
 
Justice Kennedy conceded that “[t]his approach is not without its difficulties,” 
but thought that district court judges would be able to exercise their discretion to 
impose appropriate restitution amounts.63 
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented from 
this ruling.  The Chief Justice noted the difficulty of deciding what share of Amy’s 
losses could be attributed to any particular defendant, concluding that 
“[r]egrettably, Congress provided no mechanism for answering that question.”64  
He examined the majority opinion and determined that it will result in tiny awards 
for Amy, which will mean “that Amy will be stuck litigating for years to come.”65  
He acknowledged that the majority opinion cautioned against “trivial restitution 
orders,” but maintained that “it is hard to see how a court fairly assessing this 
defendant’s relative contribution could do anything else.”66  The Chief Justice 
concluded with a call for congressional action:  
 
The Court's decision today means that Amy will not go home with 
nothing.  But it would be a mistake for that salutary outcome to lead 
readers to conclude that Amy has prevailed or that Congress has done 
justice for victims of child pornography.  The statute as written allows no 
recovery; we ought to say so, and give Congress a chance to fix it.67 
 
Justice Sotomayor also dissented, essentially agreeing with Amy on every 
point.  Justice Sotomayor began by arguing that § 2259 creates an “aggregate 
causation” standard, reading the statute as “offer[ing] no safety-in-numbers 
exception for defendants who possess images of a child’s abuse in common with 
other offenders.”68  Justice Sotomayor found the majority’s interpretation 
fundamentally flawed because the statute “directs courts to enter restitution not for 
a ‘proportional’ or ‘relative’ amount, but rather the ‘full amount of the victim’s 
losses.’”69  Justice Sotomayor, too, concluded with a call for Congressional action:  
 
                                                                                                                                          
62  Id. at 1727. 
63  Id. at 1729. 
64  Id. at 1732 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
65  Id. at 1734. 
66  Id. 
67  Id. at 1734–35. 
68  Id. at 1737 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
69  Id. at 1739. 
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In the end, of course, it is Congress that will have the final say.  If 
Congress wishes to recodify its full restitution command, it can do so in 
language perhaps even more clear than § 2259’s “mandatory” directive 
to order restitution for the “full amount of the victim’s losses.”  Congress 
might amend the statute, for example, to include the term “aggregate 
causation.”  Alternatively, to avoid the uncertainty in the Court’s 
apportionment approach, Congress might wish to enact fixed minimum 
restitution amounts.  See, e.g., § 2255 (statutorily imposed $150,000 
minimum civil remedy).  In the meanwhile, it is my hope that the Court’s 
approach will not unduly undermine the ability of victims like Amy to 
recover for—and from—the unfathomable harms they have sustained.70 
 
IV.  THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE COURT’S DECISION 
 
While Justice Kennedy’s opinion can be critiqued on a number of different 
issues, it is perhaps most badly flawed on two points.  First, as a matter of 
conventional legal theory, the Court fundamentally misunderstood how 
contributing causation operates in the law.  Second, at the practical level, the Court 
failed to answer the key issue in the case: how much restitution Amy should 
receive from any individual defendant.  This Part explains why the Court’s 
decision misses the mark on both points. 
 
A. Contributing Cause is a Conventional Legal Principle that the Court Should 
Have Held was Embodied in § 2259. 
 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion expressed skepticism about the extent to which an 
alternative to “but for” causation has already found a home in American law.  But 
this skepticism is undeserved.  To achieve the justifiable overriding social policy 
goal of providing full restitution to child pornography victims, § 2259 simply 
adopted the widely-recognized principle of contributing causation. 
Justice Kennedy failed to follow a well-recognized principle for construing 
statutes.  In previous decisions, the Court repeatedly refused to construe statutes in 
ways that would “frustrate Congress’s manifest purpose.”71 Section 2259, lower 
courts had consistently held, was “phrased in generous terms, in order to 
compensate the victims of sexual abuse for the care required to address the long 
term effects of their abuse.”72  Section 2259 thus is an integral part of a larger 
statutory scheme addressing “a tide of depravity that Congress, expressing the will 
of our nation, has condemned in the strongest terms.”73  
                                                                                                                                          
70  Id. at 1744. 
71  E.g., United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 427 (2009). 
72  United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 966 (9th Cir. 1999). 
73  United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 259 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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Justice Kennedy’s opinion acknowledged the remedial purpose underlying the 
statute but believed that “Congress has not promised victims full and swift 
restitution at all costs.”74  Holding individual defendants responsible for all of 
Amy’s loss, he thought, would be “twist[ing] [the statute] into a license to hold a 
defendant liable for an amount drastically out of proportion to his own individual 
causal relation to the victim’s losses.”75 
But conventional tort law (which is often regarded as a model for criminal 
restitution) has never tried to limit liability to an individual’s “causal relation” to a 
victim’s losses.  Instead, tort law has typically considered whether a wrongdoer 
(i.e., a tortfeasor) has contributed in some way to a larger loss.  For example, the 
American Law Institute has identified contributing cause as a general principle of 
tort law sufficiently well-established to be included in its restatement.76  Under 
American tort law, as explicated by the American Law Institute’s Restatement: 
 
“[w]hen an actor’s tortious conduct is not a factual cause of harm under 
the standard in § 26 [i.e., independently sufficient or but for causation] 
only because one or more other causal sets exist that are also sufficient to 
cause the harm at the same time, the actor’s tortious conduct is a factual 
cause of the harm.”77   
 
This approach recognizes, for purposes of tort law, that it is often impossible 
to identify a single “cause” for an event; a fire burning down a house, for example, 
is caused not only by a match but also by fuel to burn, lack of a downpour, and a 
fire department being too far away to immediately respond.78  In determining tort 
compensation, the proper question is whether the defendant’s act is part of a 
“causal set” producing harm.  Paroline effectively conceded he was part of such a 
set when he acknowledged that “Amy’s profound suffering is due in large part to 
her knowledge that each day, untold numbers of people across the world are 
viewing and distributing images of her sexual abuse.”79  Of course, the “untold 
numbers” he was alluding to included him.  Convicted defendants like Paroline 
should not be able to escape responsibility to pay significant restitution by hiding 
in a crowd.  
The Restatement notes that well-established tort precedent (pre-dating 
Congress’ 1994 enactment of § 2259) underlies the contributing cause approach.  
The Restatement explains that, for example, “[s]ince the first asbestos case in 
                                                                                                                                          
74  Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1729 (2014). 
75  Id. 
76  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1 (Am. Law Inst. 2000). 
77  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 
cmt. f, at 381 (Am. Law Inst. 2010) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. 
78  See id. § 27 Reporters’ Note cmt. f, at 391 (collecting authorities discussing this point).  
79  Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 50, Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014) 
(No. 12-8561). 
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which a plaintiff was successful, courts have allowed plaintiffs to recover from all 
defendants to whose asbestos products the plaintiff was exposed.”80  While 
numerous toxic tort cases illustrate the contributing cause approach, the 
Restatement identifies much deeper roots: “Nuisance cases were the pre-toxic-
substances equivalent of asbestos and other such cases, and courts resolved them 
similarly.”81  In one Fifth Circuit case from 1951, for example, the Circuit 
explained that: 
 
According to the great weight of authority where the concurrent or 
successive acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting 
independently of each other, are in combination, the direct or proximate 
cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is impossible to 
determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is 
responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not 
have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted 
from the act of the other tortfeasor . . . .82 
 
In other words, traditionally in American tort law, an “independent-
sufficiency requirement is not followed by the courts . . ..  [Instead], the courts 
have allowed the plaintiff to recover from each defendant who contributed to the 
. . . injury, even though none of the defendants’ individual contributions were 
either necessary or sufficient by itself for the occurrence of the injury.”83  
Justice Kennedy tacitly acknowledged that these tort law principles supported 
Amy’s position, but maintained that these principles “can be taken too far.”84  In 
                                                                                                                                          
80  RESTATEMENT, supra note 77, at § 27 Reporters’ Note cmt. g, at 392 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) 
(citing, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094 (5th Cir. 1973); Ingram v. 
ACandS, Inc., 977 F.2d 1332, 1340 (9th Cir. 1992); Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, 
Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 
73 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1073 & n.384 (1988) (collecting authorities).  
81  RESTATEMENT, supra note 77, § 27 Reporters’ Note cmt. g, at 393 (citing Bollinger v. Am. 
Asphalt Roof Corp., 19 S.W.2d 544, 552 (Mo. Ct. App. 1929) (“If there was enough of smoke and 
fumes definitely found to have come from defendant’s plant to cause perceptible injury to plaintiffs, 
then the fact that another person or persons also joined in causing the injury would be no defense; and 
it was not necessary for the jury to find how much smoke and fumes came from each place.”)). 
82  Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Hardee, 189 F.2d 205, 212 (5th Cir. 1951) (quoting 38 AM. JUR. 
Negligence § 257 at 946 (1941)); see also Northup v. Eakes, 178 P. 266, 268 (Okla. 1918) (where 
“separate and independent acts or negligence of several combine to produce directly a single injury, 
each is responsible for the entire result, even though his act or neglect alone might not have caused 
it.”); cf. The ‘Atlas’, 93 U.S. 302, 315 (1876) (“Nothing is more clear than the right of a plaintiff, 
having suffered . . . a loss, to sue in a common-law action all the wrong-doers, or any one of them, at 
his election; and it is equally clear, that, if he did not contribute to the disaster, he is entitled to 
judgment in either case for the full amount of his loss.”). 
83  Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1792 (1985) (discussing 
various cases). 
84  Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1724 (2014).  
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Justice Kennedy’s view, “Congress gave no indication that it intended its statute to 
be applied in the expansive manner the victim suggests,” which would result in 
holding offenders collectively responsible for “the conduct of thousands of 
geographically and temporally distant offenders acting independently, and with 
whom the defendant had no contact.”85 
Justice Kennedy overlooked the most fundamental reason for interpreting the 
statute as Amy did: the statute was designed to insure that Amy (and other victims 
like her) received restitution for the “full amount” of their losses.  Nothing in the 
statute gives any suggestion that Congress was concerned one whit about whether 
convicted child pornography criminals might have to pay larger restitution awards 
than they were anticipating.  Congress, quite understandably, made a well-
supported public policy choice of insuring compensation for child pornography 
victims over protecting the pocketbooks of their abusers.   
In citing various tort law treatises, Justice Kennedy also turned to the wrong 
pages.  He recited passages about negligent tortfeasors, overlooking that for 
intentional tortfeasors “[m]ore liberal rules are applied as to the consequences for 
which the defendant will be held liable, the certainty of proof required, and the 
type of damage for which recovery is to be permitted . . ..”86  Victims of intentional 
torts generally do not have to establish a standard proximate cause nexus because 
“[a]n inquiry into proximate cause has traditionally been deemed unnecessary in 
suits against intentional tortfeasors.”87  Prosser and Keeton agree that “[f]or an 
intended injury the law is astute to discover even very remote causation.”88  
Reiterating these general principles, the Restatement (Third) of Torts explains that 
“[a]n actor who intentionally or recklessly causes harm is subject to liability for a 
broader range of harms than the harms for which that actor would be liable if only 
acting negligently.”89  
In construing § 2259 as a tort-like statute, the applicable principles come from 
intentional torts, not negligent acts.  Congress crafted § 2259 by copying language 
directly from the restitution statutes for sexual assault and domestic violence.90 
These statutes impose restitution for violent crimes that involve physical invasions 
of their victims’ bodily integrity—obvious intentional torts.  Section 2259 likewise 
provides restitution for intentional torts.  It provides restitution for Chapter 110 
offenses such as the sexual exploitation of children,91 selling children,92 and 
                                                                                                                                          
85  Id. at 1725. 
86  W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 37 (5th ed. 1984) 
[hereinafter Prosser & Keeton]. 
87  Ass’d Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 548 
(1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
88  PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 86, at 37 n.27 (quoting Derosier v. New England Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 81 N.H. 451, 463 (1925)).   
89  RESTATEMENT, supra note 77, § 33. 
90  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2248, 2264 (2012).   
91  18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2012). 
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distribution, receipt, and possession of child pornography.93  These crimes are all 
felonies containing stringent mens rea requirements that a defendant must have 
acted (at least) “knowingly.”94  These child pornography crimes are thus like 
intentional torts, including well-established invasion of privacy torts.95  
Accordingly, construing § 2259 as extending liability more broadly for child 
pornography crimes than standard proximate cause principles would for non-
intentional acts, is consistent with, not a departure from, conventional tort theory. 
While some jurisdictions have recently made changes to reduce the liability of 
merely negligent tortfeasors, the new Restatement reports that “there is, so far as 
we are aware, no authority whatsoever for exempting intentional tortfeasors from 
joint and several liability.”96  It is generally accepted that “[i]ntentional tortfeasors 
have been held jointly and severally liable since at least the decision in 
Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799) . . ..”97  This 
view continues today, as “[n]ot a single appellate decision has been found that 
stands for the proposition that joint and several liability of intentional tortfeasors 
has been abrogated or modified.”98   
Conventional tort principles for intentional tortfeasors are well illustrated by 
Professors Harper and James who give the example of “several ruffians [who] set 
upon a man and beat him, each inflicting separate wounds.”99  Under traditional 
tort doctrine, the ruffians—intentional tortfeasors—are each “liable for the whole 
injury.”100  Amy is the 21st century victim of these hypothetical attackers.  She is 
“set upon” by digital “ruffians” who are all harming her.  Even if her psychological 
wounds can somehow be viewed as “separate,” conventional tort law demands that 
all the ruffians be held liable for her “whole injury.”  
The Harper and James hypothetical has a very clear real-world parallel, as the 
Court’s decision interpreting § 2259 will no doubt be applied to the almost word-
for-word identical § 2248.  Enacted as part of the Violence Against Women Act on 
the same day as § 2259, § 2248 governs restitution for sexual assaults occurring 
within federal jurisdiction.101  The provision thus covers federal crimes involving 
                                                                                                                                          
92  18 U.S.C. § 2251A (2012). 
93  18 U.S.C. §§ 2252–2252A (2012). 
94  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2012) (forbidding “knowingly” possessing child 
pornography). 
95  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977) (intentional invasion of 
seclusion); id. § 652D (intentional invasion of privacy); RESTATEMENT, supra note 77, § 46 
(intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
96  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY, supra note 76, § 12 
Reporters’ Note cmt. b. at 113 (Am. Law Inst. 2000). 
97  Id. at 111. 
98  Id.  
99  Fleming James, Jr. & Roger F. Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L. REV. 761, 776 (1951).  
100 Id. 
101 18 U.S.C. § 2248 (2012). 
20 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol 13:1 
multiple physical injuries: gang rapes and serial rapes.  Consider the case of a 
victim gang raped by five men on one night or by five men on five sequential 
nights.  The victim then requires medical and psychological care.  Under the 
Paroline decision, courts are limited to awarding restitution for each defendant’s 
“proportional share of the harm” or his “relative contribution” to the injuries.  This 
would not only be highly impracticable and intrusive to the victim, but it will 
invite a “tortfest” because each man can reduce his restitution liability by 
encouraging other men to join in and rape the victim.  Such an approach is morally 
reprehensible.  Moreover, what if law enforcement is able to apprehend only one 
of the five rapists?  On Paroline’s apportionment theory, the victim will only 
receive restitution for twenty percent of her losses, rather than the “full amount” 
promised by Congress.  Congress avoided such difficulties by simply commanding 
that sexual abusers within federal jurisdiction must pay the “full amount” of their 
victim’s losses—a reasonable dictate that the Supreme Court should have 
followed. 
Justice Kennedy should have treated Paroline like the gang of ruffians or the 
gang rapists.  Paroline voluntarily joined a de facto joint criminal enterprise 
connecting child pornography producers, distributors, and possessors.  Under the 
common law approach for such joint enterprises, “the act of one is the act of all, 
and liability for all that is done is visited upon each.”102  Paroline did not need to 
formally conspire with other persons.  Instead, “if one person acts to produce 
injury with full knowledge that others are acting in a similar manner and that his 
conduct will contribute to produce a single harm, a joint tort has been 
consummated even when there is no prearranged plan.”103  As a joint tortfeasor, 
Paroline would then be liable to pay for “the entire harm,” or, as § 2259 puts it, to 
pay for the “full amount of the victim’s losses.”  
Justice Kennedy’s single-minded focus on apportionment seems to stem from 
the belief that full liability is somehow “disproportionate” to a defendant’s 
crime.104 But tort law is never proportionate to culpability.  A few seconds of 
inattentive driving can lead to a multi-million dollar wrongful death judgment.  A 
small tap on an eggshell plaintiff can cause a skull to collapse with huge liability.  
The overarching tort rule is that a wrongdoer takes his victim as he finds her.105  
Justice Kennedy perversely deviated from that rule only because any alleged lack 
of “proportionality” stems from the fact that Amy has suffered large losses.  
The overriding goal for joint and several liability is compensating innocent 
victims, not spreading losses evenly across culpable defendants.  In enacting § 
2259, Congress simply decided to place reimbursement ahead of other goals.  Such 
an approach has the undeniable advantage that the risk of a wrongdoer’s 
insolvency “is placed on each jointly and severally liable defendant—the [victim] 
                                                                                                                                          
102 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 86, at 346. 
103 1 Fowler V. Harper & Fleming James, Jr., The Law of Torts § 10.1 at 699 (1956). 
104 Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1726 (2014). 
105 RESTATEMENT, supra note 77, § 31. 
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does not bear this risk.”106  This point is particularly important here because many 
child pornography criminals are indigent while innumerable others are beyond the 
reach of law enforcement.  The only way for victims to actually obtain restitution 
for the “full amount” of their losses is by collecting from a handful of solvent 
defendants.  Amy, for instance, has received victim notices in more than 1800 
cases since January 2006.  She has received restitution awards in approximately 
180 cases107 and has now recovered slightly more than forty percent of the full 
amount of her losses.108  Yet more than seventy-five percent of her collections 
have come from just a single defendant with substantial assets.109  If Amy were 
remitted to piecemeal collection of tiny fractional shares of restitution, she will 
likely face decades of litigation that might never lead to full recovery.  
Moreover, Justice Kennedy should have recognized that an unhappy wealthy 
criminal can seek contribution from other solvent offenders.  Attempting to deflect 
this sensible outcome, Justice Kennedy rejected the possibility, concluding that 
Amy did not “point to any clear statutory basis for a right to contribution in these 
circumstances.”110  It is not clear why Justice Kennedy found this troubling, since 
on this interpretation, § 2259 simply tracks the traditional common law rule that 
contribution is unavailable between intentional tortfeasors.111  
But Justice Kennedy should have recognized a right to contribution if a well-
heeled child pornography offender were to ever actually file a contribution lawsuit 
against another well-to-do offender.112  A right to pursue a contribution action has 
been recognized in other restitution settings.113  Such decisions rest on the fact that 
                                                                                                                                          
106 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY, supra note 76, § A18 cmt. 
a. 
107 Much of the difference between the number of notices and the number of awards is due to 
the fact that Amy lacked legal counsel in 2006.  In 2008, Amy obtained counsel.  In 2009, that 
counsel began litigating selective test cases, initially withdrawing 80% of her restitution claims.  Joint 
Appendix vol. I at 158, Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014) (No. 12-8561).  Because the 
case law has developed in the years since, Amy’s counsel now generally pursues all of her restitution 
claims to their conclusion.  
108 Joint Appendix vol. I at 94, Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014) (No. 12-
8561).   
109 See Excerpt of Proceedings, United States v. Staples, No. 2:09-CR-14017, (S.D. Fla. 2011) 
(Doc. 32), 2009 WL 2827204 (ordering the defendant pay “Amy” $3,680,153 in restitution, jointly 
and severally with other defendants, for possessing, receiving, and/or disseminating child 
pornography). 
110 Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1725. 
111 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 86, at 336 (historically, no contribution action was 
available to an intentional tortfeasor because the claim would rest “entirely [on] the plaintiff’s own 
deliberate wrong”). 
112 Of course, such a lawsuit would proceed through legal counsel.  As registered sex 
offenders, child pornography defendants should not have personal contact with each other.  
113 See, e.g., United States v. Arledge, 553 F.3d 881, 899 (5th Cir. 2008) (a defendant held 
jointly and severally liable for a restitution award “may seek contribution from his co-conspirators to 
pay off the restitution award”). 
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the Supreme Court has recognized that even if Congress did not expressly create a 
contribution remedy, “if its intent to do so may fairly be inferred from . . . [other] 
statutes, an implied cause of action for contribution could be recognized . . ..”114  In 
enacting § 2259, Congress required that all defendants must pay the “full amount” 
of a victim’s losses,115 which itself is a recognition that some defendants might 
have to pay more than others.  Against this backdrop, it would have been fair to 
infer Congress’ intent to create a system of joint and several liability combined 
with contribution.  As the Fifth Circuit panel opinion explained below:  
 
Holding wrongdoers jointly and severally liable is no innovation.  See, 
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (CERCLA).  It will, however, enable Paroline 
to distribute “the full amount of the victim’s losses” across other 
possessors of Amy’s images.  Among its virtues, joint and several 
liability shifts the chore of seeking contribution to the person who 
perpetrated the harm rather than its innocent recipient.116   
 
Justice Kennedy should have concluded that Congress properly created a 
regime in which innocent crime victims receive “full” restitution, leaving it to 
guilty defendants to sort out among themselves who will bear the financial burden 
and by how much. 
As a final point, Justice Kennedy was concerned that interpreting § 2259 to 
impose similar expansive liability might raise a constitutional concern under the 
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.117  This concern, however, is 
completely misplaced because the Supreme Court “has never actually applied the 
Excessive Fines Clause to criminal restitution,” as even Paroline himself was 
forced to concede.118  Presumably, this is because a “fine” is a “pecuniary criminal 
punishment or civil penalty payable to the public treasury.”119  Conversely, a 
restitution award under § 2259 is payable to the crime victim as compensation for 
her losses and thus is not a criminal penalty to which the Eighth Amendment even 
applies.120  
                                                                                                                                          
114 Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 77, 90 (1981); 
see, e.g., Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 297 (1993) (inferring a 
contribution action because no evidence suggested it would “frustrate the purposes of the statutory 
section from which it is derived”). 
115 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1) (1996). 
116 Joint Appendix vol. II at 347, Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014) (No. 12-
8561). 
117 Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1726. 
118 Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 58, Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014) 
(No. 12-8561), 2013 WL 4518605. 
119 Fine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004); see United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 
321, 327–28 (1998). 
120 Justice Kennedy relied on Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986), for the proposition that 
restitution awards have penal aspects.  Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1724 (2014).  But 
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B. The Court’s Decision Gives No Real Guidance on What Kind of Restitution 
Awards Victims Should Receive. 
 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion also fails to provide any real guidance on the key 
question in the case: how much restitution Amy should receive.  Justice Kennedy 
did not dispute that Amy suffers substantial losses from child pornography crimes.  
In a key passage in the opinion, however, Justice Kennedy concluded that “a court 
applying § 2259 should order restitution in an amount that comports with the 
defendant’s relative role in the causal process that underlies the victim’s general 
losses.”121  Justice Kennedy explained that in making this determination, courts 
could consider various factors, including: 
 
the number of past criminal defendants found to have contributed to the 
victim’s general losses; reasonable predictions of the number of future 
offenders likely to be caught and convicted for crimes contributing to the 
victim’s general losses; any available and reasonably reliable estimate of 
the broader number of offenders involved (most of whom will, of course, 
never be caught or convicted); whether the defendant reproduced or 
distributed images of the victim; whether the defendant had any 
connection to the initial production of the images; how many images of 
the victim the defendant possessed; and other facts relevant to the 
defendant’s relative causal role.122   
 
Justice Kennedy cautioned that “[t]hese factors need not be converted into a 
rigid formula, especially if doing so would result in trivial restitution orders.”123 
In cautioning against “trivial” restitution awards, Justice Kennedy appears to 
have been responding directly to an argument Amy made in the closing paragraphs 
of her brief.  Amy warned that apportioning restitution among multiple defendants 
will mean “trivial” restitution for her.124  Amy explained that her images were, at 
that time, identified in 3,200 American federal and state criminal cases.125  She 
also noted that, unfortunately, these prosecuted federal cases represent just a 
                                                                                                                                          
Kelly involved an older restitution statute that was not tailored to victims’ losses, Kelly, 479 U.S. at 
53, and did not give the victim any right to restitution, id. at 52.  Section 2259, in contrast, mandates 
an award calculated with reference to a victim’s losses, 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3) (1996), and the 2004 
Crime Victims’ Rights Act now promises victims that they have the “right to full and timely 
restitution . . . ” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(6) (2012).  
121 Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1727. 
122 Id. at 1728 (citing Brief for the United States at 49, Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 
1710 (2014) (No. 12-8561) 2013 WL 5425148 (which had listed these factors)). 
123 Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1728. 
124 Amy’s Merits Br., supra note 5, at 65. 
125 Id. 
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fraction of the child pornography criminals who were harming her because law 
enforcement can only apprehend a small fraction of those who distribute and 
possess her images.126  Amy suggested that assuming law enforcement could even 
apprehend ten percent of the criminal collectors of her images is a “generous 
assumption.”127  Amy further explained that she is harmed not only by child 
pornography crimes committed in this country, but also by those committed 
overseas.128  Amy suggested that a “fair estimate” was that forty-five percent of the 
child pornography criminals are American.129  
 Based on these figures, Amy surmised that a ballpark estimate of Paroline’s 
“market share” of Amy’s harm is 1/71,000 and that his restitution obligation to 
Amy would be a trifling amount: about $47—calculated by taking the full amount 
of her losses ($3,367,854) and then multiplying by 1/3,200 (the total number of 
cases where her images had been found) and then 1/10 (the ten percent law 
enforcement apprehension rate) and then 45/100 (the percentage of child 
pornography criminals who are found in this country).130   
Chief Justice Roberts’ dissenting opinion addressed these troubling numbers.  
After recounting the computation, Chief Justice Roberts noted the majority’s 
disclaimer that trivial awards were inappropriate, but he concluded, “it is hard to 
see how a court fairly assessing this defendant’s relative contribution could do 
anything else.”131 
Since the Paroline decision, federal district judges have used a variety of 
methods to calculate the amount of an appropriate restitution award.  One federal 
district court judge started with approximately 500 restitution awards for “Vicky” 
and then doubled that number to reflect those who might, in the future, be ordered 
to pay her restitution.132  The judge then awarded her restitution in the amount of 
1/1000 of her remaining, uncompensated losses and explained that it was 
reasonable to assign as [the defendant’s] restitution 1/1000 (0.1%) of “Vicky’s” 
remaining losses.133  While such approaches generate a specific number that can be 
entered into a restitution judgment, they hardly qualify as rational or not trivial.  
One illustration of this problem is the infinite regress outcome.  While awarding 
restitution in the amount of 1/1000 produces a number today, next year the amount 
could be something like 1/1100 and the year following 1/1200, etc.  Of course, the 
amounts awarded begin to regress towards zero—meaning the victim may never 




129 Amy’s Merits Br., supra note 5, at 65 (citing DOJ REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 6, at 
14 (table regarding domestic vs. international P2P file sharing of child pornography)).   
130 Amy’s Merits Br., supra note 5, at 65 & n.19 (calculating 3,367,854 x 1/3,200 x 1/10 x 
45/100 ≈ $47). 
131 Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1734 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
132 United States v. Crisostomi, 31 F.Supp. 3d 361, 365 (D.R.I. 2014). 
133  Id. 
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receive full restitution (particularly when the difficulties of collecting restitution 
awards are factored in).   
Other district courts have declined to award even these small amounts, but 
have instead decided to award nothing to child pornography victims.  Illustrative of 
this approach is the case of United States v. Hanlon,134 decided less than two 
months ago in the Middle District of Florida.  In that case, the Government had 
sought restitution for two young female victims: “Vicky” and “Sarah.”  Both of 
these victims had suffered substantial losses which they quantified in a similar 
fashion to Amy.  Nonetheless, the district court declined to award even a single 
dollar in restitution to either victim.  With regard to Vicky, for example, the district 
court held:  
 
[i]t is reasonably predictable that the Vicky Series will continue to be a 
staple of the internet among those interested in child pornography.  
Predicting the number of future convictions and/or restitution orders for 
crimes contributing to Vicky’s general loses [sic] is virtually impossible, 
other [sic] to say that if past history is any indication the number will be 
fairly substantial.135   
 
The district court also relied on the fact that the “government has presented no 
evidence from which the Court can reliably estimate the broader number of 
offenders involved in possession or distribution of the Vicky Series images.”136  Of 
course, these problems will exist in every case, meaning that if the Hanlon 
approach is widely followed, Vicky may receive little or no restitution at all. 
These cases illustrate an overarching problem of the Paroline decision: 
inevitably under the Court’s vague guidance, restitution awards will vary from case 
to case and victim to victim, based on little more than a happenstance of how a 
trial judge decides to approach restitution issues.  In a federal criminal justice 
system committed to equal treatment under the law, such random disparities are 
troubling.  
Problems such as these were well summarized by Chief Judge Anne L. Aiken 
of the District of Oregon, who joined in asking for congressional action to overturn 
Paroline: 
 
While I, like the [Supreme] Court, am confident of a district court’s 
ability to implement the causation standard approved in Paroline, the 
results are unlikely to serve the stated purpose of § 2259 and fully 
compensate victims for their losses.  As noted by the dissent, “experience 
shows that the amount in any particular case will be quite small—the 
                                                                                                                                          
134  See United States v. Hanlon, No. 2:14-cr-18-FtM-29DNF, 2015 WL 310542 (M.D. Fla. 
Jan. 23, 2015). 
135 Id. at *4. 
136 Id. 
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significant majority of defendants have been ordered to pay Amy $5,000 
or less.  This means that Amy will be stuck litigating for years to come.”  
Such piecemeal results hardly remedy the “continuing and grievous 
harm” caused by the repeated exploitation of child pornography victims.  
While I do not necessarily agree with the dissent that “[t]he statute as 
written allows no recovery,” I certainly agree with the admonition that 
“Congress [should] fix it.”137  
 
Fortunately, some members of Congress have proposed a comprehensive 
broad-based “fix” for the problem—a subject for the next section of this article. 
 
V. THE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM: THE AMY AND VICKY ACT 
 
Because of the obvious limitations in the Paroline decision, prominent 
members of Congress have moved to enact legislation to establish a more workable 
system of restitution for child pornography victims.  It is important to remember 
that restitution for crime victims does not exist in the common law and is created 
solely by statute.  To the extent that Paroline’s interpretation of the existing statute 
fails to provide adequate restitution, Congress is free to change the statute.  This 
Part reviews the proposed legislation introduced in Congress and then explains 
why it is an improvement over the current regime. 
 
A. The Amy and Vicky Act 
 
On May 7, 2014, Senators Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Chuck Schumer (D-New 
York) introduced the Amy and Vicky Child Pornography Victim Restitution 
Improvement Act of 2014 (referred to here as the “Amy and Vicky Act” or “AVA” 
for short).138  When the bill failed to be considered in the 113th Congress, Senators 
Hatch and Schumer introduced the Amy and Vicky Child Pornography Victim 
Restitution Improvement Act of 2015 (AVA) on January 28, 2015.139  An identical 
bill was introduced in the House on the same day.140  On February 11, 2015, in one 
                                                                                                                                          
137 United States v. Galan, No. 6:11-cr-60148-AA, 2014 WL 3474901, at *2 (D. Or. July 11, 
2014) (internal citations omitted). 
138 Amy and Vicky Child Pornography Victim Restitution Improvement Act of 2014, S. 2301, 
113th Cong. (2014); Amy and Vicky Child Pornography Victim Restitution Improvement Act of 
2014, H.R. 4981, 113th Cong. (2014). 
139 Amy and Vicky Child Pornography Victim Restitution Improvement Act of 2015, S. 295, 
114th Cong. (2015).  
140 Amy and Vicky Child Pornography Victim Restitution Improvement Act of 2015, H.R. 
595, 114th Cong. (2015). 
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of the first acts of the 114th Congress, the Senate passed the AVA on a vote of 98-
0.  The AVA is currently being considered in the House as S. 295 RFH.141 
The Amy and Vicky Act will establish a more workable restitution regime by 
establishing fixed amounts of restitution that convicted child pornography 
defendants must pay.  The AVA is a significant improvement over the 
discretionary regime left in place by the Paroline decision and Congress should 
swiftly enact it. 
In the AVA, Congress explicitly recognizes that modern child pornography 
crimes—which are committed and facilitated by the vast scale and anonymity of 
the Internet—require new approaches.  The AVA begins by recounting important 
findings concerning the nature of child pornography crimes and the need for 
restitution for those crimes.  Congress re-emphasizes the Supreme Court’s 
longstanding holding in Ferber that “[t]he demand for child pornography harms 
children because it drives production . . . .”142  It recognizes the emerging mental 
health consensus that “[t]he harms caused by child pornography are more 
extensive than the harms caused by child sex abuse alone because child 
pornography is a permanent record of the abuse of the depicted child, and the harm 
to the child is exacerbated by its circulation”143 and “[v]ictims suffer continuing 
and grievous harm as a result of knowing that a large, indeterminate number of 
individuals have viewed and will in the future view images of their childhood 
sexual abuse.”144 
Most importantly, the findings emphasize that “[i]t is the intent of Congress 
that victims of child pornography be fully compensated for [all] the harms 
resulting from each and every perpetrator who contributes to their anguish.”145  
Congress specifically recognizes that “[t]he unlawful collective conduct of every 
individual who reproduces, distributes, or possesses the images of a victim’s 
childhood sexual abuse plays a part in sustaining and aggravating the harms to that 
individual victim.  Multiple actors independently commit intentional crimes that 
                                                                                                                                          
141 S. 295 RFH (2015) has one minor change from S. 295 as introduced.  It adds losses from 
“sexually explicit conduct (as that term is defined in section 2256)” to the definition of “full amount 
of the victim’s losses” in Section 3. 
142 S. 295 at § 2(1) 
143 Id. § 2(2).  See Statement on the Harm to Child Pornography Victims, AM. PROF’L SOC’Y 
ON THE ABUSE OF CHILDREN (Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.apsac.org/assets/ 
documents/apsac%20statement%20on%20harm%20to%20child%20pornography%20victims%2010.
29.13.pdf (“For the victims, the sexual abuse of the child, the memorialization of that abuse which 
becomes child pornography, and its subsequent distribution and viewing become psychologically 
intertwined and each compound the harm suffered by the child-victim . . ..  [I]n addition to the effects 
of child sexual abuse . . . victims of child pornography often experience an exacerbation of harms 
and/or additional problems.  These may include shame, embarrassment, fear of being identified, 
vulnerability from having their abuse filmed, fear that adults are viewing and being sexual with 
themselves or other children, and the realization that the image of their abuse will last forever on the 
internet.”). 
144 S. 295 at § 2(3). 
145 Id. § 2(5) (emphasis added). 
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combine to produce an indivisible injury to a victim.”146  This so-called “aggregate 
harm theory” was rejected by Paroline which analyzed the harms from child 
pornography under outdated and misunderstood legal theories of “proximate 
result” and a “defendant’s relative role in the causal process.”147  The AVA 
addresses the shortcomings in Paroline, providing an updated approach firmly 
rooted in the well-established theories of tort liability discussed earlier in this 
article.148 
Based on Congress’s findings about child pornography, the AVA takes three 
important steps to address the unique nature of child pornography crimes.  First, it 
incorporates the total lifetime harm to the victim from all past, present, and future 
offenders, including those known, unknown, and unknowable.  Second, it requires 
meaningful and timely restitution.  Third, it allows defendants who have paid the 
full amount of the victim’s losses to spread the restitution cost among themselves. 
The AVA does not change the list of pecuniary losses eligible for restitution 
under current law.  It does, however, require courts to compute the lifetime losses 
for “medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological care,” 
“physical and occupational therapy or rehabilitation,” and “lost income.”149  The 
AVA also recognizes that the production, distribution, and possession of child 
pornography are part of a continuum of harm which begins with sexual grooming 
and sexual abuse.  It adds a new subpart which defines “full amount of the victim’s 
losses” as including “any losses suffered by the victim from any sexual act or 
sexual contact (as those terms are defined in section 2246) or sexually explicit 
conduct (as that term is defined in section 2256) in preparation for or during the 
production of child pornography depicting the victim involved in the offense.”150  
The main reason for including this provision is to capture fully the harm suffered 
by victims of child pornography crimes. 
Once a victim’s full losses are determined, the AVA directs that if a victim is 
harmed by only one defendant then that defendant must pay “an amount that is not 
less than the full amount of the victim’s losses.” 151  In the more typical scenario—
where a victim is harmed by multiple past, present, and future known, unknown, 
and unknowable offenders—a judge can award restitution in one of two ways, 
depending on the circumstances of the case. 
                                                                                                                                          
146 Id. § 2(4) (emphasis added). 
147 See Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1727 (2014).  In the AVA, Congress 
specifically rejects Paroline’s narrow approach by adopting “an aggregate causation standard to 
address the unique crime of child pornography and the unique harms caused by child pornography.”  
S. 295 § 2(6). 
148 See supra notes 76-117 and accompanying text. 
149 S. 295 § 3(1). 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at § 3(3). 
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First, the judge can order the defendant to pay “the full amount of the victim’s 
losses.”152  Or, second, utilizing judicial discretion, the judge can award certain 
specified amounts depending on the child pornography offense committed: 
$250,000 for offenses involving the production of child pornography, $150,000 for 
offenses involving the advertising or distribution of child pornography, or $25,000 
for offenses involving the possession of child pornography.153  No order of 
restitution may exceed the full amount of the victim’s losses, insuring that victims 
are not overcompensated; once a victim has received the full amount of his or her 
losses, he or she can no longer collect restitution.154 
Of course, there is a difference between the size of the restitution award 
imposed against an offender and the payment schedule on which the offender 
satisfies that award.  As with other restitution awards, defendants ordered to pay 
restitution under the AVA are protected from excessively burdensome payments 
by other provisions in the federal criminal code, including 18 U.S.C. § 3664—the 
so-called restitution “enforcement provision.”155  
Restitution awards under the AVA are subject to § 3664, which gives a trial 
judge discretion in setting the amount an individual defendant must pay towards 
his restitution obligation.156  Even a significant restitution obligation is mitigated 
by § 3664’s directive to enter a reasonable payment schedule.157   In setting a 
payment schedule, a judge must consider all relevant factors, including “(A) the 
financial resources and other assets of the defendant, including whether any of 
these assets are jointly controlled; (B) projected earnings and other income of the 
defendant; and (C) any financial obligations of the defendant; including 
obligations to dependents.”158  Such payments may consist of “a single, lump-sum 
payment, partial payments at specified intervals, in-kind payments, or a 
combination of payments at specified intervals and in-kind payments.”159  Section 
3664 also specifies that defendants can move the court to modify restitution 
payment orders when there is “any material change in the defendant’s economic 
circumstances that might affect the defendant’s ability to pay restitution.”160 
The AVA also holds defendants who are ordered to pay the full amount of the 
victim’s losses “jointly and severally liable” to the victim with all other defendants 
                                                                                                                                          
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. Of course, a victim is always free to pursue additional civil litigation to recover losses 
not covered by criminal restitution. 
155 See United States v. Ekanem, 383 F.3d 40, 43 (2d Cir. 2004). 
156 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a) (2002). 
157 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(B)(2) (2002). 
158  Id. 
159 Id. § 3664(f)(3)(A). 
160 Id. § 3664(k). 
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against whom an identical order of restitution has been entered.161  This, along with 
a right of contribution, allows defendants to spread the losses among and between 
similarly situated defendants.162 Defendants can bring contribution claims in 
federal court in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  This will 
allow courts to allocate payments among defendants using “such equitable factors 
as the court determines are appropriate so long as no payments to victims are 
reduced or delayed.”163 
 
B. Amy and Vicky Act Improvements 
 
The Amy and Vicky Act significantly improves the convoluted restitution 
regime left in the wake of the Paroline decision.  The biggest improvement is the 
availability of statutorily-determined restitution amounts.  Of course, this approach 
helps victims by assuring that they will receive substantial restitution rapidly, but it 
also provides significant benefits for everyone involved in the restitution process.  
Perhaps most significantly, it simplifies the restitution process for prosecutors, 
probation officers, and judges.  As even a quick perusal of post-Paroline court 
decisions reveals, substantial litigation is occurring over how to apportion 
restitution losses caused by countless defendants.  As noted above,164 district courts 
are currently struggling over formulations, and reformulations, based on the so-
called Paroline factors.  The AVA would bring such burdensome litigation to a 
close.   
The AVA also provides certainty to defendants.  Right now, the restitution 
that a defendant will ultimately be ordered to pay is something of a crapshoot, with 
the ultimate payment dependent on the formula that a trial judge selects.  Under the 
AVA, defendants will know about their potential restitution obligation when they 
make plea decisions.   
One objection that defense advocates may raise to the AVA is that the 
statutory amount is akin to federal mandatory minimum sentences.  Mandatory 
prison terms have recently and repeatedly come under fire as unduly restricting the 
ability of judges to craft appropriate sentences.165  We agree that mandatory 
minimums can sometimes be draconian and blunt,166 and so do some of the AVA’s 
                                                                                                                                          
161 Amy and Vicky Child Pornography Victim Restitution Improvement Act of 2015, S. 295, 
114th Cong. § 3(4) (2015). 
162 Id. § 3(5). 
163 Id. 
164 See supra notes 132–134 and accompanying text. 
165 Compare Attorney General Eric Holder Urges Congress to Pass Bipartisan ‘Smarter 
Sentencing Act’ to Reform Mandatory Minimum Sentences, DEP’T OF JUST. (Jan. 23, 2014), 
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 2014/January/14-ag-068.html, with John S. Martin, Jr., Why Mandatory 
Minimums Make No Sense, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 311 (2004). 
166 See, e.g., Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 
(2010).   
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key sponsors.167  Although reasonable people can differ on the appropriateness of 
such mandatory sentences, it is important to understand that the AVA does not 
specify mandatory prison sentences designed to punish offenders.  Instead, the 
AVA is a remedial statute designed to provide compensation that is akin to joint 
and several liability in civil tort law.  No one suggests that a tort defendant who is 
ordered to pay the full amount of a victim’s losses is somehow subjected to a 
“mandatory minimum.”  Like joint and several liability, the AVA spreads liability 
for the full amount of a victim’s losses across a wide, and often ever-increasing, 
number of defendants who all become contributors and payors.  Instead of one 
defendant paying one amount and another defendant paying another amount and 
still other defendants paying nothing, the AVA requires all defendants to pay 
something according to their means and in accordance with a reasonable and 
proportional payment schedule under 18 U.S.C. § 3664.  The inherent inequity of 
the post-Paroline ad hoc multi-factor driven approach is replaced by a simple and 
streamlined statutory assessment, which is below the statutorily established fine. 
 It is also important to note that the statutory amounts are only imposed when 
a child pornography victim establishes that her actual losses are greater than the 
statutory amount.  For example, the only reason Amy could be awarded $150,000 
for distribution of her child sex abuse images is that she has actual losses that 
vastly exceed that amount.  Most importantly, once a victim has received 
compensation for the full amount of his or her total aggregate losses, he or she can 
no longer seek restitution, and every defendant’s restitution obligation for that 
victim will end. 
Such an approach not only ensures that victims are fully compensated for 
losses that they suffer from child pornography crimes, but also easily complies 
with constitutional requirements.  Criminal defendants can hardly complain about 
being ordered to pay restitution of $25,000, or even $250,000, to a victim when, 
under well-settled law, they can already be ordered to pay a fine of $250,000 to the 
Government.168  To give money to a victim in an amount which is less than or 
equal to the amount payable to the federal treasury can hardly be considered cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
But what about a situation where a single defendant was ordered to pay, by 
himself, all of a victim’s losses?  This situation remains nothing more than a law 
school hypothetical, because the millionaire child pornography defendant has not 
yet surfaced in a real world case.  But to ensure fairness for defendants who have 
paid very sizable restitution awards, the AVA improves upon existing law by 
specifically creating a contribution action for defendants who are ordered to pay 
the full amount of a victim’s losses and who have paid at least the statutory amount 
                                                                                                                                          
167 See, e.g., Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States 
Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and Effective 
Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 192–95 (1993). 
168 See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3) (1995) (authorizing a fine of $250,000 for any felony 
conviction). 
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towards their restitution obligation.169  This provision, along with 18 U.S.C. § 
3664, obviates any Eighth Amendment “excessive” fine concerns, since indigent 
defendants will typically only pay a fraction of the restitution they have been 
ordered to pay while wealthy defendants will have a contribution action to spread 
their restitution obligation across multiple defendants.  To be sure, it may be 
burdensome for a rich defendant to track down other defendants in other cases to 
contribute to restitution payments.  But as the Fifth Circuit explained it in its 
Paroline decision, such an approach properly “shifts the chore of seeking 
contribution to the person who perpetrated the harm rather than its innocent 
recipient.”170  It is far better that this burden be borne by a wealthy defendant 
convicted of child pornography than by (as under current law) innocent victims 
who may or may not have resources to pursue far flung litigation.  This is a 
legitimate public policy choice by Congress, which does not run afoul of the 
Eighth Amendment or any due process concerns. 
The possibility of a contribution action should be more than enough to 
dispense with any constitutional question that might theoretically arise under the 
AVA.171  A more direct answer to constitutional concerns is that, properly 
understood, the Eighth Amendment has no bearing at all on criminal restitution 
issues.  Whether or not the Eighth Amendment applies to restitution remains an 
unsettled issue.  Most federal courts have found that restitution is remedial in 
nature and therefore not subject to Eighth Amendment punishment or “excessive 
fine” limitations, but a circuit split does exist on this issue.172  The Paroline 
decision flagged the possibility that large restitution awards could raise 
constitutional concerns, but did not rule on the issue one way or the other.173 
The better view on this question is that restitution (at least as provided in the 
AVA) is not a punitive measure subject to the Eight Amendment’s Excessive Fines 
Clause, but rather a compensation designed to restore crime victims.174  There is an 
                                                                                                                                          
169 Amy and Vicky Child Pornography Victim Restitution Improvement Act of 2015, S. 295, 
114th Cong. § 3(5) (2015). 
170 In re Amy Unknown, 636 F.3d 190, 201 (5th Cir. 2011). 
171 It is also important to recognize that a wealthy defendant who is ordered to pay all of a 
victim’s restitution will present an “as applied” challenge to the AVA rather than a “facial” 
challenge.  See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).  Accordingly, any challenge on 
this issue will lead only to a reduction of a wealthy offender’s restitution award, not general 
invalidation of the AVA. 
172 Compare In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749, 771–72 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (holding 
Eighth Amendment not applicable to § 2259 because the purpose of restitution “is remedial, not 
punitive”), with United States v. Dubose, 146 F.3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[R]estitution under 
the [Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (“MVRA”)] is punishment” and subject to Eighth 
Amendment limitations “because the MVRA has not only remedial, but also deterrent, rehabilitative, 
and retributive purposes.”  (internal citation omitted)).  
173 See Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1725–26 (2015).   
174 See United States v. Visinaiz, 344 F. Supp.2d 1310, 1318–23 (D. Utah 2004) (Cassell, J.); 
see also Brief of “Vicky” and “Andy” as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Amy Unknown, 
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obvious incongruity in claiming that restitution is a “fine” covered by the Clause 
because a “fine” is “a pecuniary criminal punishment or civil penalty payable to 
the public treasury.”175  Conversely, a restitution award under § 2259 is payable 
not to the public treasury, but to the crime victim.176  And the findings that are 
included in the AVA make clear that these awards are designed not to punish 
defendants, but rather to ensure “that victims of child pornography [are] fully 
compensated for all the harms resulting from each and every perpetrator who 
contributes to their anguish.”177 
Even if the Constitution’s prohibition on excessive “fines” can somehow be 
contorted to apply to such situations, a fine is only excessive if “it is grossly 
disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.”178  Child pornography 
felonies are serious crimes, punishable by lengthy prison terms.179  Nor can such 
crimes be called “victimless” crimes.  As the Second Circuit recently explained: 
 
The ease with which a person can access and distribute child 
pornography from his home—often with no more effort than a few clicks 
on a computer—may make it easier for perpetrators to delude themselves 
that their conduct is not deviant or harmful.  But technological advances 
that facilitate child pornography crimes no more mitigate the real harm 
caused by these crimes than do technological advances making it easier 
to perpetrate fraud, traffic drugs, or even engage in acts of terrorism—all 
at a distance from victims—mitigate those crimes.  If anything, the noted 
digital revolution may actually aggravate child pornography crimes 
insofar as an expanding market for child pornography fuels greater 
demand for perverse sexual depictions of children, making it more 
difficult for authorities to prevent their sexual exploitation and abuse.180 
 
In sum, the AVA complies with all constitutional requirements and protects 
individual defendants from being solely responsible for restitution.  It creates an 
easy-to-administer restitution regime that ensures full compensation for victims 
while reducing the litigation burden for courts.  It is thus a significant 
improvement over the post-Paroline regime—a more rational and predictable 
system than the ad hoc case-by-case regime that Paroline confusingly constructed.   
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In this article, we have reviewed the legal issues surrounding restitution for 
child pornography victims.  In our view, the Supreme Court’s Paroline decision 
failed to fully implement the congressional mandate that victims receive restitution 
for the “full amount” of their losses.  Congress should move swiftly to ensure full 
restitution for child pornography victims by enacting the proposed Amy and Vicky 
Act—a more rational scheme for awarding restitution. 
But in closing, it may be useful to remember that the legal issues swirling 
around restitution decisions have real world consequences for real world people: 
the defendants who must pay the awards and the victims who need those payments.  
We are mindful that large restitution awards may have financial consequences for 
criminal defendants.  But the stark fact remains that criminals have a choice—to 
commit the crime or not to commit the crime.  Having voluntarily chosen to 
commit a crime with serious lifelong financial repercussions, we are 
unsympathetic to any argument that convicted child pornography criminals should 
be able to escape providing victims with full compensation. 
It is more important to hear the experiences of the innocent victims of these 
crimes, who desperately need compensation.  Recently, Amy eloquently explained 
her endless struggle—and her need for restitution.181  Amy first described the pain 
she feels for the crimes committed against her: 
 
The past eight years of my life have been filled with hope and horror.  
Life was pretty horrible when I realized that the pictures of my childhood 
sex abuse were on the Internet for anyone and everyone to see.  Imagine 
the worst most humiliating moments of your life captured for everyone 
to see forever.  Then imagine that as a child you didn’t even really know 
what was happening to you and you didn’t want it to happen but you 
couldn’t stop it.  You were abused, raped, and hurt and this is something 
that other people want.  They enjoy it.  They can’t stop collecting it and 
asking for it and trading it with other people.  And it’s you.  It’s your life 
and your pain that they are enjoying.  And it never stops and you are 
helpless to do anything ever to stop it.  That’s horror.182 
 
Amy then went on to describe how her life improved when restitution became 
a possibility: “I felt lots of hope when my lawyer started collecting restitution to 
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help me pay my bills and my therapist and for a car to drive to therapy and to just 
try to create some kind of ‘normal’ life.  Things were getting better and better.”183 
Amy, however, was caught in the litigation maelstrom that led up to the 
Supreme Court case.  She explained that “we started having problems with the 
restitution law.  Judges sometimes gave me just $100 and sometimes nothing at 
all.”184  But: 
 
[a]fter a long time and a lot of court hearings all over the country, my 
case was finally at the Supreme Court.  I couldn’t believe how long and 
how far my case and my story had gone until I was sitting there in the 
Supreme Court surrounded by so many of the people who have 
supported me and helped me during these years.185 
 
Amy obviously hoped for a favorable Supreme Court decision, not just for 
her, but for “all the victims like me—who were so young when all these horrible 
things happened to us—[I hoped we could all] get the restitution we need to try 
and live a life like everyone else.”186  But then came the Supreme Court’s ruling, 
which, for Amy, “was even worse than getting no restitution at all.  It was sort of 
like getting negative restitution.  It was a horrible day.”187 
Amy, however, was excited to learn that members of Congress introduced a 
bill bearing her name and the name of Vicky (whom Amy met at the Supreme 
Court argument).  She is “hopeful, that Congress can fix this problem once and for 
all.”188    
We too are hopeful that the United States House of Representatives will act 
soon to pass the Amy and Vicky Act.  Victims like Amy and Vicky deserve to 
collect full restitution from those who harm them—something that the restitution 
statute has long promised in theory but failed to deliver in practice.  The Supreme 
Court in Paroline seemed to recognize that its ruling narrowing the restitution that 
child pornography victims could receive would be a mere placeholder until 
Congress finally acted.  Now that the Senate has passed the Amy and Vicky Act 
98-0, the House of Representatives should do the same and make full restitution 
for child pornography victims a reality.  Child pornography victims deserve 
nothing less.   
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